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PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PERSPECTIVE
AND LEGISLATIVE OPPORTUNITIES
RONALD C. BROWN*
A recent study by experts in the field of public sector labor relations
concluded, after a careful and thorough investigation:
The members of the Task Force are of the firm opinion that in-
action m developing and initiating basic policies for employee rela-
tions in any government unit is short-sighted at best. Indeed we
think continued inaction will prove to be a serious error. We be-
lieve that policies that will provide for the orderly participation of
employees and their organizations in matters affecting their wel-
fare are essential in all areas of government employment and should
be inaugurated where they do not now exist.'
The charge that legislative inaction is "short-sighted" and a "serious
error" should not be dismissed lightly Although several states have en-
acted legislation providing a comprehensive framework for collective
bargaining in the public sector, most states either have legislation of a
limited scope or have yet to establish any means by which the growing
number of public employee unions may negotiate improved conditions
of employment. It is appropriate, therefore, that those states presently
seeking to assess or reassess their legislative needs should be provided a
perspective of the statutory, extra-legal, judicial, and political develop-
ments in this area, in order that they may have full advantage of the
years of experience and experimentation of other states in developing
and applying public employee collective bargaining legislation.
L THE GROWING NEEDS OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS
Public sector collective bargaining has proven itself to be a fact of life
rather than a passing phenomenon. Indeed, labor relations involving
*B.S, J.D, University of Toledo; LL.M., University of Michigan. Associate Pro-
fessor of Law, The College of William and Mary.
1. "Pickets at City Hall"-Report and Recommendations of the Twentieth Century
Fund Task Force on Labor Disputes in Public Employment, m THE CRsIs IN Putac
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE DECADE OF THE SEvENTEs 213 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
TASK FORCe]. See generally Srmth & Clark, Reappraisal of the Role of the States n
Shaping Labor Relations Law, 1965 Wis. L. Rv. 411.
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public employees is easily the fastest growing area of the law, reflectin-
an increase from 10 to almost 15 million public employees within tlie
last decade,2 with a correlative increase in public sector umon member-
bersup at a rate of more than, 600 percent that of private industry union
membership.3 Of approximately 2.7 million federal employees, 52 per cfent
are covered by union agreements and about a million are union members.
of the over 10 million persons employed by state and local governments,
about 28 percent are covered by union agreements and over 2.6 million
belong to unions.4
Although the debate over the legitimacy of umomsm in the public
sector has lost much of its fervency, it is not overly academic to consider
the reasons for the explosive growth of the movement. Although em-
ployees may be expected always to seek better working conditions, it
has become apparent that public employees are seeking improvement
with unparalleled and increasing militancy Arguably, for too many
years the public employer has given economic credence to the traditional
"public servant concept" of public employment, as reflected by low
compensation levels and paternalistic personnel practices., Moreover,
many public employees feel that because of their advanced skills or edu-
cation, they can contribute to the decisionmaking process affecting
their employment situation, including the nature of the service they
provide. For example, teachers have sought guaranteed participatory
rights on such issues as class size, discipline, calendar, and educational
leave policies; policemen have argued for the right to have their voices
heard on the issues of citizens' review boards and two-man patrol car re-
qmrements for dangerous neighborhoods; firefighters want to know that
2. Hearings on HR. 12532, HR. 7684, and HR. 9324 Before the Special Subconinm.
on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 70, 71 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings]. See also Stieber, Collective Bargaimng m the Public Sector, in CHALLENGES
TO CoLLEcrv BARGAINING 65, 87 (Ulman ed. 1967)
3. Ross, Those Newly Militant Governmem Workers, FORTuNE, Aug. 1968, at 104.
Private industry union membership increased by 12 percent, while public sector umon
membership grew by 88 percent.
4. Hearings, supra note 2, at 71.
5. See, e.g., Weisenfeld, Public Employees Are Still Second Class Citizens, 20 LAB.
Lj. 138 (1969).
Recent data indicate that nearly 800 full-time employees of state-operated hospitals
in Ouo receive welfare benefits, while "Ohio penitentiary guards are so badly under-
paid and overworked that the turnover rate in 1968 was an astonishing 242%." Be-
cause of the shortage of guards, "all were required to work a immum of 60 hours a
week." Moreover, "[u]ntil recently, Pennsylvania created and dispensed poverty in
that state by providing 10% of its employees with take-home pay of $3,000 a year."
Wurf, The Right to Strike, TRIAL, Jan. 1970, at 11.
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m exchange for their protecting property and being on call for long
hours, they not only will be paid properly but also will have a guaranteed
right to participate m decisions concerning safety equipment and pro-
cedures."
The growing frustration with working conditions has comcided with
a nsmg tide of "status consciousness" among public employees, who
formerly worked at "jobs," then were employed m "occupations," and
finally were engaged in "professions." 7 This bogus currency of "pro-
fessionalism" has been used as a counterfeit issue either to encourage
unionism and militancy to achieve recognition of "professional" status
or to chasten proponents of unionism who fail to perceive that once a
"professional" status is achieved, it would be inappropriate to unionize.
Furthermore, as membership rolls have expanded m public employee
unions, employee demands for professional status have precipitated mter-
union rivalries, as well as an increase in organizational activities.8
The final and perhaps most sigificant impetus to public sector col-
lective bargaimng has been recent federal and state legislation reflecting
acceptance of the concept of public employee collective bargainig. As
late as 1960, collective bargammg by government employees was rela-
tively unheard of, with the exception of the authorization in Wisconsin
for municipalities to bargain with their employees.9 In 1962, President
Kennedy issued his historic Executive Order 10988 which extended or-
ganizational and collective bargaining rights to federal employees.1
The order was comprehensive in that it not only guaranteed the right
to negotiate a written agreement but also established election procedures
and methods to determine appropriate units and created unfair labor
practices.i" Executive Order 11491, issued m 1969 by President Nixon,
6. See H. WELLINGrON & R. WNTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND TEM Cirms 137 (1971).
7. See Brown, Professors and Unions: The Faculty Senate: An Effective Alternative
to Collective Bargaining in Higher Education?, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 252, 267-69
(1970).
8. Umion membership during the decade ending in 1970 showed increases of 265
percent by AFT to 205,000 members, 110 percent by AFSCME to 445,000 members,
and 53 percent by firefighter umons to 146,000 members. NEA membership totals over
one million, although not all members are employed under union arrangements. Hearings,
supra note 2, at 71.
9. Wis. Laws ch. 501, § 1 (1959), as amended, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (Supp.
1973).
10. 3 C.F.R. § 521 (Comp. 1959-63), revoked, Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R.
§ 861 (Comp. 1966-70), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1970).
11. It also contained a strong management rights clause, placed wages and hours
outside the scope of bargaining, and established advisory arbitrauon for grievances.
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updated the earlier provisions by allowing consultation on personnel
matters and by providing for admimstration by a Federal Labor Relations
Council of the procedures established by the two executive orders.
12
Under the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, postal employees were
granted rights substantially the same as those guaranteed private sector
employees under the National Labor Relations Act, except for the right
to strike.'3 That this act may presage future developments for federal
employees is suggested by recent statements by Secretary of Labor
Hodgson that Executive Order 11491 should be viewed only as an in-
terim measure that will gradually be revised to provide rights similar to
those guaranteed postal employees. 4
Over 30 states, having observed the lead taken at the federal level as
well as noting that strike prohibitions do not necessarily prevent strikes,
have passed legislation imposing some degree of formalized bargaimng
obligation upon the public employer. 5 Although developments at the
federal level may have provided impetus to the states to develop legisla-
non, the approaches taken by the states vary from the federal pattern.
At least 20 states have enacted reasonably comprehensive statutes of gen-
eral applicability' 6 Many of the same states, as well as several others,
have statutes dealing specifically with teachers. 7 At least 10 states single
out firefighters, policemen, or both for specific legislation.' Although
m a number of states, the courts have addressed the question of public
sector collective bargaimng without the guidance of legislation, there
12. 3 C.F.R. § 861 (Comp. 1966-70), 5 U.S.C. S 7301 (1970), as amended, 3 C.F.R.
S 505 (1972).
13. In an apparent comprormse, no management rights provision is included, and
most union security devices are forbidden. 39 U.S.C. §§ 1201-09 (1970).
14. See Shaw, The Development of State and Federal Laws, in PuLC WoRXras
AM PUBLIc UmioNs 20, 25 (Zagoria ed. 1972).
15. For a comprehensive listing of these statutes, see Blair, State Legislative Control
over the Conditions of Public Employment: Defining the Scope of Collective Bargain-
ing for State and Mumicipal Employees, 26 VAND. L. REv. 1, 3-4 n.18 (1973). For a
list summarizing the various provisions, see Hearings, supra note 2, at 132-34.
16. These states include California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, and
Wisconsin. BNA GOV'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. RF-1 51:1011 (1970)
17. There are statutes providing specifically for collective bargaining for teachers
in Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, Montana,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Id.
18. These states include Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Vermont. Id.
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remain eight states in which there is no positive law-legislative or judicial
-on the problem.19
It thus would appear that the focus of attention in states developing
public sector labor relations policies should no longer be on the propriety
of public employee umomsm but rather on the formulation of an appro-
priate legislative response. To permit the continued development of
extra-legal means of dealing with labor relations in the public sector
whereby unregulated power politics is the currency used in negotiating
collective bargaining agreements would invite disrespect for the law
and result in a quagmire of labor relations policies. Is it not a more re-
sponsible and responsive government which assesses the needs of its pub-
lic constituency and initiates and implements a statutory framework
providing strong power groups such as public employers and public em-
ployee unions with a means of accommodating their interests within
certain predictable boundaries and under the watchful eyes of trained
public officials? Just as the proverbial ostrich who sticks his head in the
sand may end up on his predator's dinner table, the public stands to be
victimnzed by the failure of its government adequately to prepare and
plan for a situation which shows no signs of abating. It is preferable for
a government to act rather than react to a situation of such vital concern
to its citizens.
Today, the position of a state without a statutory framework for bar-
gaining, although somewhat untenable, is enviable, in light of the very
real opportunity for such a state to assess the legislative experiments of
other states in public sector labor relations. By careful study, a state
can benefit greatly in extracting the best and deleting the worst features
of other legislative programs in its attempts to establish appropriate
legislation for the unique needs of its own citizens.
A consideration which adds to the urgency of the situation is the pos-
sibility that unless the states enact adequate legislation in the near future,
Congress may preempt their authority to regulate collective bargaining
ii. the public sector. Although the National Labor Relations Act blocks
out the area of public employee labor relations, leaving its regulation to
the states,20 there are indications that Congress may reconsider that ex-
emption in view of the paucity of comprehensive state legislation in the
19. Hearings, supra note 2, at 283 (statement of James D. Hodgson, Secretary of
Labor).
20. Under the defimuon of "employer," the Act specifically excludes "the Umted
States or any wholly owned Government corporation,; or any State or political
-subdivision thereof "29 U.S.C. § 152 (2) (1964).
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area. In 1970 the National Labor Relations Board asserted jurisdiction
over private colleges, a category of employers formerly left to state regu-
lation, in an action predicated in part upon the failure of the states to
provide a framework within which the employees of such institutions
could bargain collectively 21 In addition, there has been increasing pres-
sure for federal legislation which would cover nonfederal public em-
ployees of all state and local subdivisions, public and quasi-public corpo-
rations, housing authorities, and other public agencies. 22 Since the spring
of 1972, the House Special Subcommittee on Labor has held hearings
on this subject and is considering several bills with approaches varying
from removing the public employee exemption from the NLRA2 to
creating a separate labor relations agency24 or establishing separate leg-
islation specifically for teachers.25
Whether or for how long Congress will permit the states to experi-
ment legislatively or to grant public employees a limited nonstatutory
right to bargain collectively is a matter of debate.26 What should be
noted, however, is that the growing concern over questions of labor re-
lations in the public sector has achieved a national dimension.
II. THE EMERGING PATTERNS OF RESPONSE
Accompanying the organizational revolution of public employees in
the 1960's and the rising concern over the militancy and conflicts affect-
Ing labor relations in the public sector was a variety of societal responses.
Because of the economic, political, and social ramifications of permitting
public employees to bargain collectively, it was inevitable that no single
solution would emerge. For those states which have not yet responded
to the problem, the diversity of approaches in other states accentuates the
desirability of examinng the experiences thereunder in an effort to dis-
cern any emerging dominant or desirable patterns. Although develop-
ment has occurred predominantly in the area of affirmative legislation,
21. Cornell Umversity, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970).
22. See Boynton, industral Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector- Because It's
There?, 21 CATHOLIC UL. REv. 568, 568-71 (1972).
23. H.R. 12532, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
24. H.R. 7684, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
25. H.R. 9324, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
26. Associations such as NEA, AFSCME, and IAFF generally support federal legis-
lation on this matter. BNA Gov'T EMPLoYEEs RE. REP. No. 444, at B-5 (1972). If the
motive for this support is to generate pressure on the states to pass legislation, the
effort may of course become academic if the subcommittee recommends the enactment
of federal legislation.
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the courts have provided aggrieved public employees with an increasing
array of rights to organize and bargain collectively Extra-legal, de facto
arrangements have also been significant.
A. Legislative Response
Virtually all of the state statutes regulating collective bargaining in the
public sector affirmatively provide that public employees have the right
to join and form unions and to bargain collectively; however, only the
comprehensive statutes establish unfair labor practice procedures which
lirmt both public employer and union interference with those rights. Be-
yond this major point of distinction, the statutes differ in the manner in
which they treat seven basic issues: coverage, administrative machinery,
representation questions, bargaining obligations, impasse procedures,
strike resolution, and union security arrangements.
The iitial question in formulating legislation is the extent of cover-
age. In the field of labor relations, this involves either selecting special
categories of employees for particular legislative treatment or providing
one omnibus bill covering all employees. The collective judgment on the
issue varies,2 7 with seven state statutes covering all state and local em-
ployees, eight covering all public employees except those in specified
occupations such as teaching, firefighting, or police work, and three
providing for total coverage contingent upon local option. Six states
have statutes covering state employees only, and eight other statutes
apply only to local employees. In terms of categorical legislation, seven
states have statutes applying to firefighters only, one to police only, and
four to police and firefighters, while 16 state statutes apply to teachers
only If any pattern can be discerned from this checkerboard listing, it
escapes obvious detection. What is probably most reflected by the varied
approaches is not the unique needs of the different public employee
groups but rather their ability to apply political pressure on particular
legislators. Such a piecemeal approach surely invites interumon rivalry
and political skirmishes. Political pressures for legislation granting "most
favored status" to a particular group can best be answered with an omm-
bus law, which, with adequate drafting, satisfies the special needs of all
classes of public employees. 2 Additionally, a single comprehensive statu-
27. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 133-34.
28. Hawaii, for example, sets forth appropriate umts m its law, including separate
units for blue collar supervisory and nonsupervisory employees, "teachers and other
personnel of the department of education under the same salary scale," college faculty,
1973]
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tory scheme dealing with all occupational categories of public employees
and administered by a single agency with exclusive jurisdiction is more
economical and contributes to a smoother functioning labor-management
relations process by precluding the possibility of conflicting rulings and
procedures of different tribunals.29
Another issue requiring legislative resolution is the type of administra-
tive machinery, if any, which is needed to regulate collective bargaimng
in the public sector. Fifteen states have utilized existing administrative
agencies, including state departments of labor, while eight states and the
District of Columbia have created new agencies specifically charged
with the administration of the public employee-management relation-
ship.30 Ten states have delegated labor relations responsibilities to exist-
ing specialized agencies, such as state boards of education for teachers
and state boards of health for nurses. The policy judgment on this issue
hinges on the economic and practical feasibilities involved in utilizing no
agency (thus leaving the duty of admimstering the law to the courts),
using an existing agency, or creating a new agency It would appear
that most states have found it preferable to place administration of public
sector collective bargaimng legislation with agencies which have or can
develop an expertise in labor relations matters rather than to leave en-
forcement of statutory rights solely to the courts.
Representation issues in labor-management relations involve questions
essentially of allocating power. In resolving the conflicting interests of
unions and employers, an adequate statute covering labor relations in
the public sector must provide effective procedures for selection of bar-
gaming representatives and for determination whether they represent ap-
propriate bargaimng units. Most statutes permit secret ballot elections,
and 19 states have a separate state agency which makes the determma-
tion of appropriate units.3' However, seven states permit the local em-
ployer to determine the appropriate bargaining unt.32
firemen, policemen, nurses, and other classes of public employees. HAwAii REv. STAT.
§ 89-6 (Supp. 1971).
29. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) has endorsed
the omnibus bill approach, noting that such legislation would better contribute to the
smooth functioning of labor-management relations in the public sector. ACIR, LABOR-
MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 103-04 (1969). Additionally,
there would seem to be some merit on principles of fairness in not passing piecemeal
legislation covering some employees but not others.
30. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 132-34.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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In deciding the appropriateness of a bargaining unit, it is necessary
initially to determine the scope and composition of the unit. The most
commonly applied criterion is the community of interest standard em-
ployed in the private sector under the NLRA.33 There is, however, a
discernible trend in state public sector legislation toward developing
criteria designed to lirmt or avoid the establishment of fragmented bar-
gaming umts ' 4 with implications relating to scope as well as composition
of such units.
With respect to scope, it often is argued that in order to avoid num-
erous or fragmented bargaining units, inclusion of employees' in the
largest possible group should be emphasized along managerial hierarchies
such as, for example, school systems rather than schools, and college sys-
tems rather than specific institutions. Some states have codified this con-
cept by designating specific classes of employees as appropriate umts,35
an approach which undoubtedly contributes to the economic and ad-
ministrative efficiency of operating a system of collective bargaining.
Although the clear majority of states, accepting the argument that size
is not necessarily determinative of quality of representation and that an
ad hoc approach is preferable, continue to determine unit questions
through the application of the traditional community of interest standard,
the results under the two approaches often are similar.
Determinations of the composition of the appropriate unit also are
made by emphasizing the similarities of employee categories. Diffi-
culties have arisen in determining whether "satellite" employees36 and
part-time employees should be included within a larger group or have
separate representation. The developing applications of the various state
statutes indicate that both such employee categories generally are made
part of the larger unit.'
33. Sheffield Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 49 L.R.R.M. 1265 (1961); Continental
Baing Co. 99 N..R.B. No. 123, 30 L.R.R.M. 1119 (1952). For an example of appli-
cation of the standard in the public sector, see City of Warren, 61 L.R.R.M. 1206,
1207 (Mich. LMB 1966).
34. Pennsylvania law, for example, provides that in determimng the appropriateness
of a unit, the labor board shall take into consideration, but shall not be limited to,
identifiable commumties of interest and the effects of over-fragmentization. PA. STAT.
AiNw. tit. 43 S 1101.604 (Cum. Supp. 1973-74). Kansas has a similar provision. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-4327(c) (Supp. 1972).
35. See, e.g., HAwAII REv. STAT. § 89-6 (Supp. 1971).
36. In the education area, for example, this would include employees such as librar-
ians, counselors, school social workers, and school nurses.
37. For a decision on satellite employees, see In re School Dist. of Mount Vernon,
i N.Y. PERB 1-347 (1968), cited in D. Wouihrr.& R. CHANiN, TpE LAW AqD
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In conjunction with determinations of which employees should be
included in a particular bargaining unit, it is necessary to decide whether
certain categories of employees should be excluded from the unit be-
cause of possible conflicting interests or loyalties. The private sector
concept of excluding all supervisors from the bargaining unit has not met
with uniform acceptance in public sector legislation. It has been argued
that there are certain categories of supervisors, such as school depart-
ment heads, principals, and curriculum coordinators, who traditionally
have worked in concert with other employees and should be included
with them in a bargaining unit. The artificial segregation of such per-
sonnel arguably may result in the creation of an adversary relationship
with a detrimental effect upon the educational atmosphere of the insti-
tution. Although public sector legislation generally has excluded super-
visors from bargaining units containing nonsupervisory employees, sev-
eral states have recognized the vitality of the argument against exclusion
by distinguishing nominal supervisors, such as school department heads,
from true supervisors, such as school superintendents, and excluding
only the latter category from rank-and-fie bargaining umts. 8 In addi-
tion, the states have differed in their treatment of certain classifications
of employees, such as school principals. Michigan excludes principals
from rank-and-file units but permits them to form their own bargaining
units; Pennsylvania, although permitting the establishment of separate
units for principals, grants such unts only the right to consult and
not the right to bargain. 9
An important question corollary to the selection of an appropriate
representative is whether representation should extend to all employees
within the bargaining unit or be restricted to union members. The con-
PRAcacE oF TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS 2:28 n.5 (1970). For decisions on part-time workers,
see Reese Pub. School Dist., 1969 L. Op. 253, CCH LAB. L. REP. 49,994.84 (Mich.
LMB).
38. For an analysis of this issue, see 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 442 (1973).
39. For a discussion of the Michigan law on this issue, see Hillsdale Community
Schools v. Michigan Labor Med. Bd., 24 Mich. App. 36, 179 N.W.2d 661 (1970);
School Dist. of the City of Dearborn v. Labor Med. Bd., 22 Mich. App. 222, 177 N.W.2d
196 (1970). In a Florida case, Orr v. Thorp, 308 F Supp. 1369 (S.D. Fla. 1969), the
court held that a state act prohibiting membership of administrative and supervisory
school personnel in unions that represented teachers violated the equal protection and
freedom of association guarantees of the Constitution. The decision raises questions as to
whether inclusion of supervisory members might result in domination of a rank-and-fie
union, which presently would constitute an unfair labor practice in many states. Penn-
sylvama law permits first-level supervisors to form their own unit and to meet and
discuss. PA. STAT. Am. nt. 43, § 1101.704 (Cum. Supp. 1973-74).
[Vol. 15.57
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cept of exclusive representation under the NLRA, requiring that all em-
ployees within the unit accept representation by the umon selected by
the majority, has had wide acceptance in public sector legislation.40 Not-
withstanding its appeal to democratic principles, proportional representa-
tion has been rejected by all states except Califormia, 4 presumably be-
cause of the belief that nonexclusive representation does not promote
effective collective bargaining.
Statutory provisions establishing the obligation to negotiate must de-
fine the nature and extent of the obligation, as well as the subjects of
bargaining. With respect to the nature of the obligation to bargain,
labor legislation should attempt to reconcile the interest of the parties
in freedom to contract with the public interest in peaceful resolution of
labor disputes. If the duty to bargain is not compulsory, the problem
of sham bargaining could well arise. This dilemma is resolved under the
NLRA by the requirement that employers and unions bargain in good
faith with respect to "wages, hours and other conditions of employ-
ment", there is, however, no mandate that concessions must be given or
an agreement reached.42 Although several states have legislation requiring
the parties merely to "meet and confer," 4 the majority of states have
40. E.g., PA. STAT. Aui. tit. 43, § 1101.606 (Cum. Supp. 1973-74).
41. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 13085 (West Supp. 1972). Minnesota recently changed its
statute to provide for exclusive rather than proportional representation. MrNN. STAT.
ANN. § 179.65 (Supp. 1972). It is significant to note that one state court has held
that exclusive representation violates an employee's right to refrain from joining a
umon. Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1969). For
an exposition of the exclusivity concept and its implications in the public sector, see
Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights in Public
Employment, 55 CoaELL L. Rxv. 1004 (1970). Manifestations of the suggested impli-
cations recently have surfaced in Wisconsin, where it has been held that minority
unions may not address school boards in a representative capacity during public meet-
ings on issues which were being negotiated by the majority union. Board of School
Dir. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm., 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92 (1969). On a
different but related issue, the rights of individuals to present grievances to their em-
ployers are retained by all statutes and modeled after section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), which also provides that the union has a right to be present
and that no settlement shall be inconsistent with the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. See, e.g., MicHt. Com. LAWS ANN. § 423.26 (1967).
42. 29 U.S.C. S 158(d) (1970).
43. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 450(3); CAL. Euc. CODE § 13085 (West. Supp.
1973); CAL. Gov'T CODE 55 3505, 3530 (West Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE § 33-1272 (Supp.
1973); ORE. REv. STAT. 5§ 342.440, 342.710 (1971). Governor Reagan of. California
recently vetoed a bill which would have given public employees "bargaining" rather than
"'conferring" rights. Chronicle of Higher Education, Oct. 23, 1973, at 2. For an illustra-
ton of a state statute patterned after the NLRA, see Mici. Coma. LAws ANN. 5 423.215
1973]
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followed the NLRA and imposed a requirement of "good faith" bargain-
ng. Moreover, experience indicates that meet and confer statutes44 are
soon modified by legislation or decision and that there is little practical
distincton between the two standards.45
It is also necessary that legislation prescribe the items which are to be
the subjects of the bargaining process. 46 In the private sector, "wages,
hours and other conditions of employment" are mandatory subjects
upon wich the parties must bargain until either impasse or an agreement
is reached.47 Over the years the term "conditions of employment" has
been broadly interpreted to include most matters affecting employees.
Whether a similar trend is desirable or inevitable in the public sector is
a matter of debate and of choice. Proponents of a broad scope of col-
lective bargaining argue that in the public sector, economic and policy
questions are often intermingled and indiscernible, and that narrow lim-
itations on the scope of bargaining inhibit, if not prohibit, employees
especially professionals, from making valuable contributions to the for-
mulation of institutional policies. A social worker, for example, arguing
that the needs of his clients require that caseloads be reduced, may seek
to bargain for such a change. The employer could respond that such a
decision is a matter of policy reserved for its judgment. It is indeed pos-
sible that the question of caseloads could be interpreted as a bargainable
economic matter, a nonbargainable management policy question, or
both. A New York decision suggested that public management should
be able unilaterally to make decisions involving budgetary matters but
that, as is required in the private sector, it must bargain as to the impact
(1967). Even though the NLRA approach is followed, it has been suggested that signifi-
cant variations can be established by making negotiations permissive rather than manda-
tory or by imposing the duty to bargain on the employer but not the union. See
Hearings, supra note 2, at 132-34.
44. Pure meet and confer statutes usually encounter stiff union resistance on the
ground that such statutes preclude employees from negotiating as equals, instead re-
ducing them to "collectively begging." For model "meet and confer" and "negotia-
tons" statutes prepared by ACIR and designed to protect the interests of public
employers, see TAsK FORCE, supra note 1, at 222-30.
45. Since "unions in the public sector have pressed for the same type of demands
and with the same vigor under both models ," the distinction has become blurred.
At present, only Alabama, California, and Missouri have "pure" meet and confer
statutes. Edwards, The Emerging Duty To Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REv.
885, 896 (1973).
46. For a thorough review of this subject, see Edwards, supra note 45, at 908-27
47. 29 U.S.C. S 158(d) (1970) See also NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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of such decisions upon employees.4 8 The scope of the bargaining obliga-
ton in New York was further expanded by a recent decision interpret-
ing that state's statute as requiring that a public employer bargain over
all mandatory subjects "except in cases where some other applicable
statutory provision explicitly and definitively prohibits the public em-
ployer from making an agreement as to a particular term or condition of
employment." 49
Although states such as New York have broadened significantly the
scope of the bargaining obligation, others have taken a step in the op-
posite direction. For instance, in a Connecticut case a teachers' union
sought to bargain over the length of the school day and school calendar.
The court ruled that the school board need not bargain over such sub-
jects, holding that "hours" were not a condition of employment under
the statute.50 Such myopic judicial interpretations illustrate the need for
legislative specificity in defining the scope of the bargaining obligation.
To neglect this vital issue invites power conflicts in public sector labor
relations, with the result that the scope of bargainable subjects will be
directly related to the relative bargaining powers of the parties.
The provisions in most state statutes as to the scope of bargamable
subjects are patterned after the NLRA's broad and open-ended term-
inology of "wages, hours and other conditions of employment." Many
states, however, perhaps in recognition of perceived differences in bar-
gaining in the public and private sectors, specifically exempt certain
subjects from the scope of bargaining. This is accomplished either
through a management rights clause or by existing civil service legisla-
tion.
Following the example of the federal government under Executive
Orders 10988 and 11491, several states have limited the scope of bar-
gaming by enumerating certain management rights or prerogatives which
are retained by public employers. Hawaii, for example, provides that
48. City School Dist. of New Rochelle, 4 N.Y. PERB 3704 (1971).
49. Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 129, 282 N2.2d 109,
113, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 23 (1972) (emphasis supplied).
50. West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526 (1972).
Although this case was decided on the basis of the specific wording of the statute, it
illustrates how far some courts have gone in narrowing the scope of the bargaining
.obligation. For an opposite holding under a different and more typical statute, see
.Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 37 Wis. 2d 483, 155 N.W.2d
78 (1967).
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the public employer retains the right to "(1) direct employees; (2) de-
termine qualificaton standards for work , (3) relieve an employee
from dunes because of lack of work or other legitimate reason; (4)
maintain efficiency of government operations; (5) determine methods,
means, and personnel by which the employer's operations are to be con-
ducted; and take such actions as may be necessary to carry out the mis-
sions of the employer in cases of emergencies." 51 Since such reservations
of power do much to lirmt the scope of bargaining, employee frustra-
tion over inability to influence policy or mission decisions may continue
and result in smoldering labor unrest. In recognition of this problem,
Maine has provided that public employers of teachers shall be required
to meet and consult on policy questions, although there is no duty to
bargain on such matters. 52 Similarly, the Montana teacher statute pro-
vides: "The matters of negotiation and bargaining for agreement shall
not include matters of curriculum, policy of operation, selection of
teachers and other personnel, or physical plant of schools or other facil-
ities, however nothing herein shall limit the obligation of employers to
meet and confer [on those items]." 53
If there is any discernible pattern in this area, it is that there is and
will continue to be an expansion of the scope of bargamable subjects,
notwithstanding occasional interpretive restrictions. The pressures em-
ployees are applying to gain a voice over policy matters may well indi-
cate that such matters involve real needs which should be discussed with
the employer. If those subjects are not appropriate for collective bar-
gaining, then a state may seek to quell uncertainty by specific legislation
exempting certain management decisions from negotiation. In the alterna-
tive, or perhaps concurrently, statutory provisions can institutionalize
and guarantee employee input on a meet and confer basis on certain im-
portant policy decisions affecting the public interest as well as the inter-
ests of employees.
Existing laws, primarily civil service legislation, also serve to limit
the scope of bargaining in many states. For instance, the Connecticut
statute provides that the manner in which merit examnations are con-
51. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 89-9(d) (Supp. 1971). States having similar provisions
include New Hampshire, Kansas, Wisconsin, and Nevada.
52. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965 (Supp. 1972-73).
53. MoNr. REv. CODES ANN. § 75-6119 (2d Rep1. Vol. 1971). See also MiNN. STAT.
Am. § 179.73 (Supp. 1973). For examples of statutes specifying that an employer has
no duty to bargain over "mission questions," see VT. STAT. ANN. tUt. 3, § 905(b) (1972);
Wis. STAT. Am. § 111.91(2) (a) (Supp. 1973)
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ducted and graded and the procedure for the appointment of individuals
from lists established by such examinations are not proper subjects of
negotiation.54 Unions, however, have sought to bargain over the criteria
used to evaluate employees, the methods of evaluation, and grievance
procedures. A question thus arises as to whether collective bargaining or
civil service legislation takes precedence.5 5 In Michigan, upon the failure
of the legislature to resolve the conflict, the state supreme court held
that those sections of the civil service laws dealing with mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining under the collective bargaining law were superseded
pro tanto by the latter legislaon. The legislatures of at least eight other
states, however, have provided that civil service legislation will take
precedence over public sector collective bargaining statutes.57 Else-
where, the question presumably awaits judicial resolution."
Of primary importance in the public sector is the establishment of
procedures to resolve labor disputes in order that the government can
continue to function smoothly in dispensing its services.59 Virtually all
state legislation permits and encourages grievance procedures to settle
disputes over the terms of existing agreements. There are two types of
arbitration: "interest" arbitration, which decides the substantive terms
of a new contract and thereby resolves a bargaining impasse, and the
more common "grievance" arbitration, which settles disputes over the
54. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANr. § 7-474(g) (1972).
55. For a brief discussion of the issue, see H. WELLINGTON & R. Wimi, JR., supra
note 6, at 142-45. Uncertainty on this point has the foreseeable consequence of im-
peding negotiations by making the subjects of bargaining a matter of interpretation
by each employer, even though, arguably, no conflict should arise until after a con-
tract is executed. Conflicts with "home rule" provisions can create similar problems
of precedence. See Blair, supra note 15, at 9-10.
56. Civil Service Comm'n v. Wayne County Bd. of Super, 348 Mich. 363, 184
N.W.2d 201 (1971). Similar results for limited categories of employees appear to be
mandated by several statutes. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 70124 (West 1965)
(transit workers); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474(f) (1972) (mumcipal employees);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 162A § 1-19 (1958) (transit workers).
57. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 3500 (West 1966), § 3525 (West Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-4330(a) (Supp. 1972); ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 969 (Supp. 1972-73);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 1781 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. Ut. 43, § 1101.703 (Supp.
1973-74); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 904 (Supp. 1973); WASH. RV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.10a
(1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.91(2) (Supp. 1973).
58. For an examination of possible conflicts between civil service and collective
bargaining statutes, see Comment, The Civil Service-Collective Bargaining Conflict m the
Public Sector: Attempts at Reconciliation, 38 U. Cm. L. Rav. 826 (1971).
59. See generally SORRY No GovERNMENT TODAY UNIONS vs. CrrY HALL (R.
Walsh ed. 1969).
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interpretation of an existing contract.6" Although binding grievance arbi-
tration procedures are uniformly part of private sector agreements, the
states have approached the subject cautiously 61 However, it is becom-
ing evident that such provisions are legal and desirable mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining.62
In the area of resolving bargaining impasses, the majority of state laws
attempt to induce settlement through mediation and conciliation services
and fact-finding procedures. Even though the latter procedures are
usually advisory in nature and designed primarily to persuade agreement,
the release of an agency's findings and recommendations may influence
public opinion and result in pressures being brought against the parties
to resolve their differences."'
If, after these persuasive procedures are utilized, impasse still exists,
the question is then presented how it shall be resolved-by employer fiat,
by economic coercion such as a strike, or by institutionalized procedures
which culminate in a final and binding decision by a neutral third
party Proponents of binding interest arbitration argue that collec-
tive bargaining is desirable, that strikes are undesirable, that the only way
to avoid strikes is to provide a substitute, and that the most effective sub-
stitute is binding arbitration.64 Although most states which have enacted
public sector collective bargaining legislation initially have accepted
the first two premises of this argument, many of them, after a period
60..For a general discussion of arbitration procedures in the public sector, see Note,
Legality and Propriety of Agreements to Arbitrate Major and Minor Disputes m
Public Employment, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 129 (1968)
61. Early court decisions held that arbitration of grievances by governmental em-
ployers was an unlawful delegation of power; however, this judicial attitude began
to change in 1951 when a Connecticut court upheld grievance arbitration. Norwalk
-Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951). For more
xecent developments, see Fischbach, Grievance Arbitration m Public Employee Dis-
ciplinary Cases, 22 LAB. L.J. 780 (1971); Krislov & Peters, The Arbitration of Grtev-
ances in Educational Units in the Late 1960's, 23 LAB. LJ. 25 (1972)
62. See, e.g., Oakland County Sheriff's Dept. v. Local 23, AFSCME, BNA Gov'T
FNM.oYEES REL. REP. No. 227, at F-1 (Mich. LMB 1968); Tremblay v. Berlin Police
Union, 108 N.H. 416, 237 A.2d 668 (1968); City of Warwick v. Warwick Reg. Fire-
,men's Ass'n;:106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969). See also Note, Arbitration and Agency
Shops as Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1238 (1968).
63. For discussion of 'these impasse procedures, see Brown, supra note 7, at 288-92.
Fbr An illustration of a provision for making public the recommendations of fact-
finding, see N:D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-13 (Repl. Vol. 1971),
-64. R. DoHRTY &:W OBERER, TEACHERS, SCHOOL -BOARDS AND COLLE-rIVE BARGAINING:
A CHANGING OF THE GUARD 104 (1967).
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of experimentation with binding arbitration, have begun to question the
validity of the proposition that all strikes by public employees are un-
desirable.
Interest arbitration may be compulsory or voluntary, as well as ad-
visory or binding.6 5 Contrary to popular belief, the use of voluntary
interest arbitration is increasing, with Connecucut, Delaware, Maine,
New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Vermont
all experimenting with it.66 Illustrative of the statutory provisions in
these states is the Hawaii legislation providing that a public employer
shall have the power to set forth "an impasse procedure culminating in
a final and binding decision, to be invoked in the event of an impasse
over the terms of an initial or renewed agreement." 67
On the other hand, compulsory arbitration, despite its occasional at-
tractiveness to the public, is more rarely used, except in the case of cer-
tam critical employees, such as police and firefighters. Thus far, five
states have adopted this procedure."' Only Nevada has enacted com-
pulsory interest arbitration legislation of general applicability; however,
,even under this statute, the governor must, in his discretion, affimatively
direct arbitration prior to the submission of the dispute to fact-finding. 9
In examining developing statutory patterns regarding impasse pro-
cedures, it becomes clear that traditional restraints on the use of econorme
and other pressures by public employees during a labor dispute are being
replaced by innovative procedures designed to provide peaceful and
meaningful collective bargaining. Although it is too early to predict
whether the bold experiments in compulsory interest arbitration will
continue or to reach a determination as to the desirability of utilizing such
a method to resolve labor disputes, it should be noted that after several
65. See Comment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the Prevemon
of Strikes rn the Public Sector, 68 MicH. L. REv. 260 (1969).
66. For an excellent exposition of the problems of binding arbitration and a compila-
tion of legal developments in this area, see McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract
Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72
'COLrm. L. REv. 1192 (1972).
67. HAwAI REV. STAT. § 89-11 (Supp. 1971).
68. Compulsory arbitration statutes covering both police and firefighters are found!
in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Statutes m Vermont and Wyomi
cover firemen only See McAvoy, supra note 66, at 1194-96. It should be noted that:
certain subjects, such as economuc matters, may be excluded from this procedure. Eo
example, Rhode Island excludes salaries, pensions, and insurance.
.69. NEv. REv. STAT. § 288.150 (1971).
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years of experience, the Michigan legislature has decided to retain com-
pulsory arbitration for police and firefighters.70
It is difficult to discuss strikes in the public sector without evoking
emotional responses, and it is on this point that the differences be-
tween public and private sector employees and employers are of ulti-
mate importance. Advocates of the right to strike argue that employees
in both sectors are equally concerned with working conditions and that
public employees should not be demed their full and equal rights of col-
lective bargaining merely because they work for the government. Op-
ponents of the right to strike respond that in addition to total intolerance
by the public of a disruption of services, there are differences between
public and private sector employment which justify a disparate treat-
ment with respect to the permissible range of economic pressures avail-
able to public employees during a labor dispute.71 It is contended that
strikes m the public sector are inappropriate since an economically dam-
aged government will not go out of business as a private employer
might;7 2 moreover, financial and legislative constraints may preclude con-
cessions to union demands. Finally, it is maintained that since a public
employer, unlike a private employer, is a political entity subject to poli-
tical pressures, to give public employees, who are voters, the right to
strike is to give them an overbalancing quantum of power which, if fully
utilized, could take inordinate amounts from the public treasury, thus
rearranging government priorities of services and, in a real sense, chang-
ing the nature of government.73
70. With the compulsory arbitration statute scheduled to expire June 30, 1972, the
legislature acted affirmatively to extend it for an additional three years. MiCH. CoMP.
LAWS AiN. § 423.245 (Supp. 1973-74).
71. For a brief overview of this subject, see Brown, supra note 7, at 299-302. See
generally Bernstein, Alternatives to Strikes in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARv. L.
REv. 459 (1971); Rhemus, Constraints on Local Govermnents m Employee Bargaining,
67 MicH. L. REv. 919 (1969); Wellington & Burton, More on Strikes by Public Em-
ployees, 79 YALE L.J. 441 (1970); Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective
Bargaimng in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969).
72. See generally Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in
Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969).
73. For a summary of these views, see Brown, Book Review, 13 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 960 (1972). A recent study indicates these fears have not materialized, at least
on the economic level. In a recent study for the Brookings Institute on the impact of
umon influence on governments, David Stanley concludes that most changes have
come at the noneconomic, policy levels and that with "few exceptions, municipal
union pressures did not result in shocking or even surprising advances," with wage
increases for muncipal employees being comparable to those m other segments of the
[Vol. 15 57
PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
As the debate continues, there have been some interesting statutory
developments. Beyond the question of limitations on the right of public
,employees to strike, legislation in this area should resolve questions of
enforcement and of penalties for violation of strike restrictions. The
statutes almost universally codify the common law ban on strikes,74
but the method of enforcement varies, perhaps in proportion to the
degree of intolerance for strikes. For example, in Delaware, Rhode
Island, and Washington, strikes are merely declared illegal, with the re-
sult that an employer must act affirmatively to obtain an injunction or
in utilizing whatever other forms of reprisal are available to it.7Y In other
states, an agency is authorized to issue judicially enforceable cease-and-
<esist orders against strikes, wich by statute are declared to be unfair
labor practices. 6
The issue of penalties, if any, to be imposed upon violators of strike
Testrictions is directly related to the question of enforcement, that is,
whether strike bans should be self-executing or should reserve to the
employer some discretion as to whether to act and how to act. A recent
survey of state strike ban penalties indicates that Nevada has attempted
to induce compliance with its ban by fining a striking union $50,000 a
4ay and its officers $1,000 a day 77 In Nebraska, a public employee may
economy. D. STAmNLY, MANAGING LocAL GovRNmEsNr UNDER UNiON PRssuRE 74
(1972).
74. See generally Barrer, Governmental Response to Public Unionrsm and Recog-
nintion of Employee Rights: Trends and Alternatives for Resolving Issues, 5i ORE. L.
REv. 113, 124-28 (1971). The United States Supreme Court recently upheld the con-
stitutonality of the strike ban for postal workers. Uniked Fed. of Postal Clerks v.
Blount, 404 U.S. 802, aff'g mern. 325 F Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1970). There have been
inany similar holdings at the state level. See, e.g, Anderson Fed'n of Teachers, Local
519 v. School City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 251 N.E.2d 15 (1969), cert. dened, 399
U.S. 928 (1970).
75. For an illustration of difficulties inherent in using injunctions to force the return
'of striking employees, see School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157
N.W.2d 206 (1968), where a court refused to issue an injunction absent a showing of
violence, irreparable injury, or breach of the peace, notwithstanding the fact that the
strike was in violation of the state statute. See also Comment, Collective Bargaining
for Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in the Public Sector, 68 MicH. L.
REv. 260, 265-69 (1969).
76. Massachusetts and Wisconsin, for example, have such provisions. For a sum-
mary of various state approaches to this problem, see Smith, State and Local Advisory
Reports on Public Employment Labor Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MIc.
L. REv. 891, 910-14 (1969).
77. TAsK FORCE, supra note 1, at 21. See generally Seidman, State Legislation on
Collective Bargaining by Public Employees, 22 LAB. LJ. 13, 19-20 (1971); Smith,
supra note 76, at 910-14.
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be imprisoned for striking' and it is a felony for an employee of the
federal government to do so.70 Many state statutes provide for discharge
and a period of ineligibility for public employment of strike partici-
pants.8 0 Significantly, if such penalties are self-executing rather than
available to an employer at its discretion, the employer may be forced
to discharge all striking employees, even if adequate replacements are
unavailable."'
Some states, apparently having learned that strike prohibitions do not
necessarily prevent public employee strikes, have legislated a limited
right to strike for certain categories of employees.8 2 For instance Hawaii
and Pennsylvana recently have enacted statutes which require employees
to exhaust certain impasse procedures and to give notice of an intent to
strike before they may "take to the streets." All of the right-to-strike
statutes limit the right by providing that an injunction may be obtained
upon proof of a clear and present danger to the safety and health of the
public.s Because of the limited experience under such statutes, it is diffi-
cult to determine whether granting a lirmted right to strike will improve
labor relations in the public sector. It is clear, however, that bold and
innovative experiments diverging from the general statutory pattern of
prohibition will prove valuable in the future to states assessing their own.
position on the question of strike legislation.
78. TASK FORcE, supra note 1, at 21.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1970).
80. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-55 (Supp. 1973). New York includes the penalty of
removing umon dues check-off privileges. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 210(f) (McKinney-
Supp. 1972).
81. Even under some of the statutes designed to operate automatically, obstacles can
arise. For example, it has been held that the state must provide adequate notice before
acting. Goldberg v. City of Cincinnati, 26 Ohio St. 2d 228, 271 N.E.2d 284 (1971), rev'g
23 Ohio App. 2d 97, 261 N.E.2d 184 (1970). Michigan has repealed the portion of its
statute which provided for automatic termination of strikers. MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN..
§ 423.202 .(1967). On the related question of the legality of selective reemployment of
strikers, there appears to be no definitive case law on the issue whether a government
employer may discrimmately refuse to rehire some, but not all, striking employees. This
problem may be litigated in the near future, since some states have created a procedure for
selective bypassing of the automatic termination procedures. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.
S 40.1-57.1 (Supp. 1973).
82. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tt. 43, § 217.1 (Supp. 1973) (police and firemen). See-
also HAWAi REV. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1971); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 41-2209 (Supp.
1973); VT. STAT. AiNi. tit. 16, §§ 1981-2010 (Supp. 1973)
83. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1971).
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The final major area requiring attention in collective bargaining leg-
islation is treatment of union security arrangements, by which unions
seek to become financially and politically secure in their bargaining re-
lationship with employers. While those favoring the utilization of union
security devices in the public sector argue that they are needed to stabilize
labor-management relations, opponents point to the inherent tendency
of power to corrupt and express the fear that a union may become so
secure that it need not consider challenges to its majority status from
other unions and may underrepresent its members, especially those hold-
ing mnority views. 4
Many states authorize voluntary dues check-offs, by which the em-
ployer deducts from paychecks the dues of union members. Although
technically not a union security device, the check-off significantly en-
hances the financial and political strength of an incumbent union. The
most extreme union security device is the union shop arrangement, which
requires employees, as a condition of continued employment, to join
the representative union within 3 0 days of employment. Union shop pro-
visions rarely are negotiated in the public sector. They are expressly pro-
hibited in the 19 states having right-to-work legislations 5 and in most
other states provisions which guarantee employees the right to refrain
from union activities and compel the employer not to discriminate on the
basis of union membership generally render union shop arrangements
illegal.
Recent efforts of public employee unions have been directed at negoti-
ation of agency shop provisions, x*hich, unlike union shop arrangements,
do not require that employees become union members. The agency shop
device requires only that employees, as a condition of continued employ-
ment, pay a fee representing their "fair share" of the bargaining costs
of their exclusive representative. Recent legislation in Hawaii permits
the charging of a service fee equivalent to dues, and the Pennsylvania
statute provides that a union may bargain for a maintenance of member-
84. See generally H. WELLINGToN & R. WnTrER, JR., supra note 6, at 93-96; Ward,
Union Security m Teacher Contracts, 22 LAB. LJ. 157 (1971); Comment, Impact of
the Agency Shop on Labor Relations in the Public Sector, 55 CoRaNzu L. REv. 547
.(1970).
85'. States with right-to-work legislation are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virgima, and Wyoming. For
a compilation of the statutes and case law 'interpretations, see NATIONAL RIGUHr To
WoRK ComMiTrEE, STATE RieH-T-To-WoRr LAws (1972).
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ship provision. 6 The cases are divided on the question whether right-to-
work laws prohibit agency shops."7 In the absence of such legislation,
the validity of an agency shop may depend upon limitation of the fee
charged nonmembers to the actual costs of negotiation; otherwise, ac-
cording to the leading case, 8 the agency shop is the "practical equiv-
alent" of a union shop and is in violation of statutory prohibitions of
employer discrimnation on the basis of umon "membership."
In the area of union security devices, as in other areas of public em-
ployee labor relations, stability and predictability require appropriately
drafted legislation. Although the response in a given state will depend
upon its resolution of policy conflicts, presently existing statutory ex-
amples provide a wealth of experience which can be utilized by a state
seeking to assess its legislative needs.
B. Judicial Response
Notwithstanding the absence of enabling legislation, de facto and
extra-legal bargaining relationships abound in states with inadequate or
nonexistent public sector collective bargaining legislation. In spite of
the doubtful legal enforceability of such agreements, public unions and
employers continue to negotiate and enter into contracts covering most
conditions of employment. For example, in Virginia, a nonstatutory
86. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 89-4(a) (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. A r. ti. 43, § 1101.705
(Supp. 1973). Wisconsin recently amended its municipal bargaining law to permit
unions to bargain for "fair share agreements" or agency shop clauses. See Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.70(2) (Supp. 1973).
87. Some right-to-work statutes specifically prohibit agency shop clauses; in other
right-to-work states, validity of the devices has rested on interpretation by a court
or attorney general. See D WOLLETT & R. CHANIN, THE LAW AND PRACrcE oF TvACmR
NEGOTiATiONS 3:75-76 (1970). For an illustration of a court upholding an agency shop
provision, notwithstanding a right-to-work statute forbidding conditioning employ-
ment on union membership, see Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159
N.E.2d 408 (1959) (The law was later repealed.).
88. Smigel v. Southgate Community School Dist., 388 Mich. 531, 202 N.W.2d 305
(1972). The court found that no attempt had been made "to relate the non-member's
economic obligations to actual collective bargaining expenses. " 202 N.W.2d at
308. Thus, if that test were met, presumably an agency shop would be permissible.
The lower court m Smigel held that the validity of an agency shop clause "hinges on
the relationship between payment of a sum equivalent to the dues of [the union] and
a non-member's proportionate share of the cost of negotiating and administering the
contract involved." An amount greater or less would be in violation of the statute.
Smigel v. Southgate Community School Dist., 24 Mich. App. 159, 180 N.W.2d 215
(1970).
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state, approximately ten agreements have been negotiated between local
governments and unions representing employees of large metropolitan
school systems and other public institutions.8 9 The continued unregu-
lated development of such extra-legal bargaining relationships may be
interpreted by the courts as an implicit mandate to develop a common
law of public sector labor relations. Moreover, the pattern of such rela-
tionships may, like a mass of weeds, sink its roots deeply and mhibit
future legislative action.
1. The Developing Law: Nationally
Wherever legislation defining the collective bargaining obligations of
public unions and employers is lacking, it is the judiciary which has been
called upon to act. Increasingly, and in a piecemeal fashion, the courts
have created a patchwork of recognizable rights of public employees to
form and join unions, to obtain recognition for purposes of bargaining,
to be free from employer discrimination or interference while engaged
in protected activities, and to have labor agreements judicially enforced.
As this developing mosaic of rights assumes first form then substance, it
would appear that the judicial attitude is changing from one of reluc-
tance to act to one of impatience with legislative maction. The Florida
Supreme Court, for example, recently held that that state's constitution
required bargaining legislation in the public sector, and that in the ab-
sence of legislative action, the court would formulate bargaining cri-
tena.90 The constitutional provision prompting this holding was one
guaranteeing employees the right to bargain collectively 91 Noting the
ease with which such a right could be abridged or denied in the absence
of statutory guidelines, the court relied upon cases involving judicially
ordered reapportionment of school districts to protect other constitution-
89. See COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE
RIGHTs OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES TO THE Gow.NioR AND THE GENERAL ASSEImLY OF Vm-
GINIA 6 (1963) [hereinafter cited as VIRGINIA REPORT]. The significance of these de facto
arrangements should not be underestimated, since, notwithstanding their dubious en-
forceability, they do in fact govern the conduct of the public employer m its relaton-
ship with nonunion as well as umon employees.
90. Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Legislature of the State of Fla, 269 So. 2d 684
(Fla. 1972).
91. FLA. CONST. art. I, S 6 provides: "The right of persons to work shall not be
denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union
or labor organization. The right of employees, by and through a labor organization,
to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged. Public employees shall not
have the right to strike."
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ally guaranteed rights in finding authority for judicially established bar-
gaining procedures 2
It appears settled that the right of public employees to organize unions
for purposes of collective bargaining is protected from public employer
interference by the first amendment to the United States Constitution.9 3
Although the right to organize carries with it a prohibition of employer
discrimination against employees engaging in protected union activities,
arguments that the constitutional right to organize implies a right to bar-
gain have thus far been rejected.94 Recognition of a constitutional right
to bargain would, in effect, entail judicially mandated collective bargain-
ing absent enabling legislation. A strong argument can be made, how-
ever, that the right to organize often is rendered nugatory in the absence
of a right to bargain. Thus, it may be only a matter of time until a court,
attempting to fashion a remedy for employer interference with the or-
ganizational rights of employees, finds that the only way in which to
remove the ill effects of the employer's actions is to order it to bargain
with its employees.95
92. 269 So. 2d at 687 The court, however, refused to issue a mandamus, stating that
it assumed the legislature would act within a reasonable time and that therefore a
court order would be premature. Id. at 688.
93. AFSCME v Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis,
398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Melton v. City of Atlanta, 324 F Supp. 315 (N.D. Ga.
1971); County of Butler v. Service Employees Int'l Union, 306 F Supp. 1080 (W.D.
Pa. 1969); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
94. In Beauboeuf v. Delgado College, 428 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1970), a union was
denied an injunction to force an employer to negotiate. Similarly, in Indianapolis
Educ. Ass'n v. Lewallen, 72 L.R.R.M. 2071 (7th Cir. 1969), it was held that although
there is a constitutional right to form a union, there is no constitutional duty to bar-
gain collectively with an exclusive bargaining agent. See also Fire Fighters, Local 794
v. City of Newport News, 339 F Supp. 13 (E.D. Va. 1972); United Fed'n of Postal
Clerks v. Blount, 325 F Supp. 879, 883 (D.D.C. 1971).
95. This was the thrust of an argument made by the Richmond Education As-
sociation in a recent Virginia case. See Brief in Opposition to the Defendants' Motions
at 11-16, Richmond Educ. Ass'n v. Crockford, 55 F.R.D. 362 (E.D. Va. 1972).
Overruling a motion to disrmss, the court tacitly found that a public employer's re-
fusal to meet with the union may have a "chilling effect" on first amendment rights.
The court suggested that "the grant of approval to organize and associate without the
corresponding grant of recognition may well be an empty and meaningless gesture."
Id. at 3116-17 However, even a union victory on this point could be hollow if no
"good faith" obligations were concurrently imposed, that is, if the employer merely
"recogrnzed" the union and occasionally discussed matters with it. For example, in
Hanover Township Fed'n of Teachers v. Hanover Community School Corp., 318
F Supp. 757 (N.D. Ind. 1970), the court found that it had no jurisdiction over an
action brought by teachers contending that the school board had not bargained in
"good faith" with their union. The position that the appropriate remedy is not com-
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Asde from constitutional arguments, however, it traditionally has
been held that a public employer may not bargain with its employees
without express authorizing legislation. The conceptual and legal bases
used to support tis position increasingly appear to be largely makeshift
arguments to forestall bargaining. For example, the argument that
bargaining interferes with the sovereignty of a state ignores the experi-
ence of other states and fails to recognize that the state bargains every
day for contractual services and supplies. 6 Another argument often
stressed is that to bargain with a union would be an illegal delegation of
power equivalent to an abdication of responsibility and would install the
union as a fourth branch of government with the power to close down
the public employer. The persuasiveness of this argument is diminished
by the experience of other states and the fact that under all collective
bargaining statutes no agreement or even concessions to employee de-
mands are requiredY7 Finally, arguments that bargaining and public serv-
ice are incompatible because of the special nature of government em-
ployers are outmoded and probably better left to the bargaining agenda.
Recent decisions on the implied authority of a public employer to
bargain with its employees or their representative" indicate that the
courts have begun to reject the traditional arguments 9 For example,
pulsory bargaining but rather "good faith procedural communcations" was taken in
New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. AFSCME, 83 N.J. Super. 389, 397, 200 A.2d 134,
139 (1964).
96. See City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
97. The NLRA, for example, imposes an obligation to bargain but specifically states
that "such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession " 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). For an illustration of the
traditional argument, see City of Fort Srmth v. Council 38, AFSCME, 245 Ark. 409,
433 S.W.2d 153 (1968). See also Board of Educ. v. Scottsdale Educ. Ass'n, 17 Ariz.
App. 504, 498 P.2d 578 (1972).
98. For an excellent review of this area of the law, see Dole, State and Local
Public Employee Collective Bargaining in the Absence of Explicit Legislative Au-
thorization, 54 IowA L. REv. 539 (1969).
99. Very often, there is little strain involved in implying authority to bargain from
the express authority of a public employer. For example, if a school board is
authorized to supervise the school system and to enter into individual contracts with
its faculty members, it is not unreasonable to imply authority to enter into a group
contract. Decisions adopting this view include Chicago Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass'n v. Board
of Educ., 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966); Local 611, IBEW v. Town of
Farmington, 405 P.2d 233 (N.M. 1965). But see Board of Educ. v. Scottsdale Educ.
Ass'n, 17 Ariz. App. 504, 498 P.2d 578 (1972).
Another imaginative and effective method of imparting legal enforceability to ne-
gotiated agreements is to incorporate them by reference into the individual employment
agreements.
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courts in Indiana, Iowa, and Illinois have held that although a public em-
ployer has no duty to bargain, it may do so on the basis of implied au-
thority 10o Although the courts thus have recognized, in the absence of
legislation, rights of public employees to organize, to be free from em-
ployer interference while engaged in protected activities, and to bargain
if the employer chooses to do so, the establishment of definitive statutory
guidelines nevertheless would appear to be a preferable approach. The
experience of Virginia with nebulous and changing judicial policies il-
lustrates the need for legislative action.
2. The Developing Law m Virgzna
Virginia law on public sector labor relations has evolved somewhat
similarly to that of other nonstatutory states, although perhaps more
slowly From the mid-1930's through the 1960's, judicial decisions, at-
torney general opinions, and legislation generally prohibited public
employee unions, or at least collective bargaining by them. Apparently,
it was believed that the negotiation of labor agreements might compro-
mse the public employer's constitutional mandate to run the govern-
ment. In 1935, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld a city
manager's regulation against unionization, ruling that firefighters could
not form or join unions.101 Twenty years later, in another case involving
firefighters, a lower court reaffirmed the power of a local government
to promulgate rules barring umonization, holding that the state's right-
to-work law was inapplicable to city or state employees. 10 2
Virginia's right-to-work statute was enacted in 1946 and guarantees
100. See East Chicago Teachers Union, Local 511 v. Board of Trustees, - Ind.
App. -, 287 N.E.2d 891 (1972); Local 4, Gary Teachers Union v. School City of
Gary, - nd. App. -, 284 N.E.2d 108 (1972); Cook County Police Ass'n v. City of
Harvey, 8 II. App. 3d 147, 289 N.E.2d 226 (1972); Chicago Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass'n v.
Board of Educ., 76 IMI. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966); State Bd. of Regents v.
United Packing House Food & Allied Workers, 175 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1970). Al-
though an implied authority to bargain was found in each of these cases, only m
Chicago Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 II. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d
243 (1972), was it held that the public employer could treat the union as the exclusive
bargaining representative for all employees within the unit. The same arguments used
for implied authority to bargain may be made for implying authorization for a public
employer to enter into agreements calling for binding grievance arbitration in the
absence of enabling legislation. Cf. Youngstown Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ, 36
Ohio App. 2d 35, - N.E.2d - (1973).
101. Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180 S.E. 410 (1935).
102. Verhaagen v. Reeder [Ct. of L. & Ch, Norfolk, Va., (1955) (unreported)],
appeal refused, 198 Va. lxxix (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 974. The case is cited in
1969-70 VA. ATr'Y GE . Op. 159.
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employees the right to work regardless of umon or nonumon affilia-
tion. 13 During the same legislative session, the Senate passed Resolution
Number 12, which in essence stated that it was contrary to Virginia's
public policy for a public employer to recognize or negotiate with a
labor union as a representative of state employees and for public em-
ployees to form organizations affiliated winth any labor unon to discuss
conditions of employment or to claim the right to strike. 0 4
Some of these older approaches to public employee unionization have
been displaced in recent years. Prior to modern Virginia cases on the
matter, Virginia's Attorney General, aware of the developing federal
court decisions upholding the constitutional right to associate and thus
to form unions, advised that public employees in Virginia had such
rights.105 In addition, he stated that although a state agency might have
implied authority to negotiate with a union representing the agency's
employees, he was advising against such negotiations in light of the 1946
Senate resolution and because implied authority to negotiate was not
then a widely accepted principle of law 106 In a subsequent opinion, how-
ever, he ruled that although any agreement reached through collective
bargaining would be of "doubtful enforceability," a school board could
discuss working conditions with any group of employees and embody the
results of such discussions in resolutions.'07
The courts have further defined the nature of bargaining rights of
Virginia public employees in three recent cases. In Carroll v. City of
Norfolk, u0 a federal district court held that a local ordinance forbidding
a firefighters' organization to affiliate with a labor union was unconstitu-
tional because it denied employees the right to associate. In a subsequent
case involving firefighters and police,' °9 it was held that absent a legisla-
tive mandate from Congress or the General Assembly, a municipal em-
ployer does not have a duty to bargain with its employees' union.1' 0
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-58 et. seq. (Supp. 1973).
104. Sj. Res. 12, Va. Gen. Assembly (1946). In 1969, this resolution was held to be
merely a statement of policy without the force of law. Fire Fighters, Local 794 v.
City of Newport News, 307 F Supp. 1113 (E.D. Va. 1969).
105. 1969-70 VA. Ar'y GEN. Op. 158.
106. Id.
107. 1969-70 VA. ATy GEN. Op. 231, 232. It is interesting to note that the Attorney
General also ruled that the Virgima Freedom of Information Act is applicable to
such discussions and thus that they must be open to the public. Id.
108. Civil Action No. 524-70-N (ED. Va., Apr. 20, 1971).
109. Fire Fighters, Local 794 v. City of Newport News, 339 F Supp. 13 (1972).
110. Id. at 17
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However, the court noted, as follows, that a public employer could, if
it desired, meet and confer with its employees to discuss conditions of
employment: "We hasten to point out that public employees
are not precluded from sitting down at a table with representatives of
the city and discussing matters concerning the employment relation-
sup." I' Finally, it has been held 12 that a school board's refusal to deal
with an employee representative could have such a "chilling effect upon
plaintiffs' fundamental rights to associate and bargain collectively" that
the right to organize "without the corresponding grant of recognition
may well be an empty and meaningless gesture on the part of the School
Board." :3
Although it appears that the Virginia cases permit a public employer
to bargain with its employees if it desires to do so, the question remains
whether any agreement reached by the parties would be enforceable.
As noted earlier, the trend of recent cases in other jurisdictions without
enabling legislation suggests that courts will enforce negotiated agree-
ments if it can be found that the public employer had implied authority
to bargain with the representative of its employees. Several Virginia
cases appear to signify the existence of such implied authority in public
employers. In McKennie v. Charlottesville & A. Ry.," 4 the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia held that since a municipal corporation had
the explicit power to contract, it had the implied authority to negotiate
an arbitration provision, as long as it retained the power to make binding
unilateral decisions. A similar result was reached in Howard v. School
Board of Alleghany County,"15 in which it was held that a general statu-
tory authorization to a school board included the implied authority to
negotiate on matters only incidentally related to the school board's ex-
press powers. The admonition of the State Attorney General in 1970
regarding the "doubtful enforceability" of negotiated agreements may
merit reexamination in light of changing attitudes.-""
111. Id.
112. Richmond Educ. Ass'n v. Crockford, 55 F.R.D. 362 (E.D. Va. 1972).
113. Id. at 364. After the court demed a motion to dismiss, the parties agreed to
drop the suit.
114. 110 Va. 70, 65 S.E. 503 (1909).
115. 203 Va. 55, 122 S.E.2d 891 (1961). An arguably competing principle can be
drawn from cases in which statutes in apparent derogation of the sovereignty of the
state are strictly construed. See, e.g., Wilson v. State Highway Comm'r, 174 Va. 82,
4 S.E.2d 746 (1939).
116. In 1973 the Virginia right-to-work law was made applicable to public em-
ployees. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-58.1 (Supp. 1973) This provision incorporates section
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C. Politcal Response
Nationally, the growing political interest in public employee labor
legislation is reflected in the increasing number of statutes being enacted
by state legislatures.11 Beyond actual enactments, evidence of political
activity can be observed in various other forms. For example, although
the legislature in New Mexico recently rejected a public employee col-
lective bargaining bill, the state's attorney general, in apparent response
to state needs, ruled that state agencies could enter into consultative or
other nonformal relationships with employee organizations." 8 As men-
tioned earlier, political interest in legislation has also taken on a national
dimension, with Congress holding hearings on the need for a federal re-
sponse."O Thus far, opponents of federal legislation have argued that
since there is insufficient state experience and because of the divergent
state approaches to the question, it would be premature for the federal
government to intervene at this time. 20 The counterargument, of course,
is that unless and until the states enact comprehensive statutes, the needs
of public employees are not being met, and that federal legislation could
fill this void.
40.1-66, which provides that "nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent
or make illegal the peaceful and orderly solicitation and persuasion by union members
of others to join a union. " Id. § 40.1-66 (Supp. 1973). This development certainly
gives tacit statutory approval to the already constitutionally protected right to form
unions; whether it also protects full umon membership rights, which implicitly in-
clude the right to bargain, is left for advocates m the area. A claim that a right-to-work
provision gave rise to a legislative duty to enact enabling legislation was accepted by
the court in Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Legislature of the State of Fla., 269 So. 2d 684
(Fla. 1972). There, however, the source of the right to bargain was a state constitution.
117. Statutes recently have been enacted in Minnesota, Kansas, Montana, Idaho, and
Oklahoma. Hearings, supra note 2, at 79-80.
118. The state personnel board then established guidelines for negotiating agree-
ments. A diluted form of legislative response has taken place in South Carolina, where
the legislature has provided grievance procedures for public employees. Id. In 1973
Virginia enacted similar legislation. VA. CODE ANw. § 15.1-7.1 (Supp. 1973) (effective
June 30, 1974).
119. See notes 22-26 supra & accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 281-87 (statement of Secretary of Labor
Hodgson). The constitutional basis for assertion of federal jurisdiction is found in
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), which upheld the application of the Fair
Labor Standards Act to certain categories of public employees as a legitimate exercise
of congressional power under the commerce clause of the Constitution. Other ex-
amples of federal regulation of labor relations involving state employees can be found
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.
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Political activity in Virginia has been typical of that elsewhere. Al-
though the growing pressures have not yet culminated in bargaining
legislation, there are indications that legislation may soon be forthcom-
ing. Beginning in the late 1960's, collective bargaining bills for separate
categories of employees, such as firefighters, police, and teachers, were
introduced into various committees of the General Assembly but were
not acted upon. In 1972, although several bills again were introduced
but never reported out of committee, political pressures were increasing,
and a Task Force was created to study the "rights of public em-
ployees." 121 In 1973, after defeat in committee of a "teachers' bargaining
bill," public employees joined together to form a coalition to press for
omnibus legislation wich would encompass all their interests. Their
combined pressure, added to developing legal rights and the presence of
increasing extra-legal bargaining arrangements, may be sufficient to per-
suade the General Assembly that the time has arrived for Virginia to
enact comprehensive collective bargaining legislation. Indeed, the Vir-
gima Municipal League and the Virginia Association of Counties have
warned that Virginia cities and counties "can ignore the winds of change
only at their risk." 122
III. LEGISLATIVE OPPORTUNITIES
A. The Need for Policy Decsions
The time has arrived when decisions regarding public sector labor re-
lations must be made. State governments must recognize that public em-
ployee unions are organizing, growing, and negotiating, and thus must be
dealt with. The choice is between regulating the growth of public em-
ployee unionism or allowing it to grow where and as it can, unchecked
by any restraining forces. Almost twenty years ago, a report by the
121. H.J. Res. 122, Va. Gen. Assembly (1972). After one year of study, the Task
Force made eight recommendations, including the need for the state to institutionalize
grievance procedures, to include public employees under the right-to-work statute,
and, if comprehensive collective bargaimng legislation were deemed desirable, to make it
uniformly applicable to all public employees, both state and local. See VIRGIMA
REPORT, supra note 89. The first two of these recommendations have already been
enacted into law
122. BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 422, at B-5 (1971). Perhaps indicative of
these "winds of change" was the recent union election conducted by the NLRB among
faculty members at Randolph-Macon College, Ashland, Va. Although as a private
college it was within the statutory jurisdiction of the NLRB, the fact that the Board
asserted its jurisdiction indicates that attitudes toward umonism are changing. (The
union was defeated by a vote of 38 to 28.).
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American Bar Association stated that "a government which imposes
upon private employers certain obligations in dealing with their em-
ployees, may not in good faith refuse to deal with its own public servants
on a reasonably similar basis modified, of course, to meet the exigencies
of public service." -12
Collective bargaining legislation for the public sector should respond
fairly to the legitimate demands of public employee unions without com-
promising the public's interest in obtaining governmental services. More-
over, because of differences between public and private employers, legis-
lators should strive to meet any umque needs of the parties rather than
merely attempting to transplant private sector labor law concepts on a
-wholesale basis into the public sector. It thus is appropriate at this point
to note several of the characteristics which differentiate public employ-
ment from private employment. 124
The most salient difference between the public and private sectors is
reflected in the limitations of power placed upon the public employer
by legislative, financial, political, and market constraints, most of which
are not subject to the employer's control. 25 For example, certain exist-
ing laws, such as those dealing with the rights of civil service employees,
may limit the scope of bargaining by placing constraints on subjects for
negotiation and on management's authority to commit itself financially
Natural market differences, including the service motivation of govern-
ment as opposed to the profit motive operative in the private sector,
make the public employer less able to pass on higher costs to its "cus-
tomers," instead causing a reallocation of existing resources. In addition,
the public employer is less responsive to economic pressures by the union,
since a government cannot go out of business. Because of these and other
differences, such as the extreme vulnerability of public employers to
political pressures, a strong argument can be made that government
should not be regarded as "just another industry" 126 Nevertheless, it
has been suggested that "certain difficulties in developing viable systems
of labor relations stem from an almost slavish adherence to the notion
that the public and private sectors cannot be treated alike." 127
123. Edwards, supra note 45, at 885.
124. See generally Smith, supra note 76.
125. For a brief overview of these problems, see Brown, Professors and Unions: The
Faculty Senate: An Effective Alternative to Collective Bargaining In Higher Edu-
cation?, 12 WM. & MARy L. REv. 252, 299-302 (1970).
126. See generally Brown, Book Review, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 960 (1972).
127. Edwards, supra note 45, at 886-87.
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B. Essentials of Public Sector Labor Legislation
Careful and thoughtful analysis of the alternative statutory approaches-
to the problems of labor relations in the public sector is of course the
initial step in drafting appropriate legislation. Drawing upon the statu-
tory experience of other states, avoiding their mistakes, and starting with
their achievements as a basis for legislation are luxuries available to a state
in the formative stage of developing public sector legislation. The options
are many and the opportunities are great, but regardless of the eventual
form of the statute, certain essential substantive elements should be in-
cluded.
The statute should, of course, recognize the right of public employees
to join or refuse to join a union. Omnibus legislation, covering all public
employee groups, has the advantage over selective legislation of avoiding
repeated demands for legislation by a plethora of employee groups. Com-
prehensive legislation also provides efficient and fair treatment of all em-
ployees, especially if administration of the act is placed in the hands of
a single agency Experience indicates that in the often controversial field
of public employee labor relations, the best way to resolve representa-
tion and unfair labor practice issues is through the use of an independent
agency established solely for the purpose of interpreting and enforcing
the provisions of the statute. To be effective, the agency should be em-
powered to regulate the conduct of the employer and the union, with
enforcement powers similar to those available to the NLRB.
128
With respect to representation questions, statutory guidelines should
be established which limit the scope of the bargaining unit to the particu-
lar employing agency (for example, a particular state college), unless it
can be shown that the bargaining unit should be larger because of the
employer's peculiar hierarchical structure (for example, the New York
system of state colleges) 129 The representation criteria should be suffi-
ciently broad to permit the inclusion of similar groups within a bargain-
ing unit but specific enough to distinguish truly diverse groups. 30 If
specified categories of employees are designated by statute to be an ap-
propriate unit, the classification should create only a presumption, which
could be overcome by proof of sufficient dissimilarities of interests. 1l
128. For a discussion of this subject, see Edwards, supra note 45, at 886-87
129. Id. at 903-08.
130. Within such a framework and to facilitate a more efficient system, it is not
inconsistent to require the administering agency to determine the most, rather thanr
an, appropriate bargaining umt.
131. This procedure would permit special categories of employees such as profes-
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For example, although the teaching and maintenance staffs of a school
-might both be classified as "educational personnel," it arguably would be
inappropriate for both to be included within the same bargaining unit.
Finally, the statute should specify whether supervisors are to be ex-
,cluded from units of rank-and-file employees. If they are excluded, a
-decision must be made whether to permit them to form a separate unit
-to negotiate or meet and consult. An attractive solution would be in-
clusion of a flexible statutory provision which, taking into consideration
-some of the unique aspects and special needs of various public employee
-groups, would permit supervisor participation where appropriate. 2
The private sector concepts of exclusive representation and secret ballot
,elections have withstood the test of time and should be adopted into pub-
lic sector legislation. However, consideration should be given to pro-
-tecting the rights of minority unions to speak freely in open forums on
-substantive issues being considered by the government. Similarly, the
right of individuals to take grievances directly to their employei should
-be implemented. Problems can be avoided if election guidelines are
*established so that representation elections can occur only "in season,"
that is, only during a fixed time period preceding the date on which the
'public employer must submit its budget requests. Such a provision would
,dimimsh the unneeded extra pressure of an unreasonable deadline during
negotiations and avoid representation contests while budgets are being
submitted.n3
All labor legislation is conceived on the prense that labor disputes
are best resolved through the process of peaceful negotiation. To ef-
'fectuate this policy, a statute should impose upon the parties the obliga-
tion to bargain in good faith and should define clearly the subjects of
-negotiation. In the private sector, experience has shown that unless a
statute establishes unambiguous lirmtations on the bargaining obligation,
litigation is constantly necessary to determine whether a matter is a sub-
ject of negotiation, with the trend being toward a continuous increase
in the number of mandatory subjects of bargaining. Management rights
clauses may be an approprate method of establishing the boundaries of
sionals, not otherwise covered by a statute, -to prove that they require separate treat-
ment.
""132. The treatment of school prmcipalg and department heads, police sergeants, head
nurses, and other supervisors is an inevitable and recurring problem in public sector
labor relations and should be dealt with as specifically as possible by legislation.
133. For a discussion of this problem, see H. W. iNGToN & R. WmNER, JR, ripra
note 6, at 89-89. For an illustrative statute, see Wis. STAT. AiNw. § 111.70 (Supp. 1972).
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negotiation if they are carefully drafted and take into account unique
characteristics of public sector employment. For example, public em-
ployees frequently desire to make recommendations regarding the "mis-
sion" of their government employer. It is submitted that the enlightened
approach is to recognize that public employees have a legitimate interest
in their employer's mission and that, as is the case in several states, a union
should be permitted to "consult" with the employer on such matters. 13
Indeed, this small safety valve could go far toward creating a smoother-
functioning bargaining process.
Finally, statutory constraints on bargaining, such as civil service and
tenure laws, should be amended to avoid potential conflicts regarding
bargaining subjects and overlapping grievance procedures. In addition,
there is no evidence that a government would be affected adversely by
permitting a collective bargaining law to supersede inconsistent pro-
visions in other laws, such as the so-called "sunslune laws," which re-
quire that all meetings of state agencies be open to the public. The pre-
ferable position, and the view of many courts, is that "meaningful col-
lective bargaining would be destroyed if full publicity were ac-
corded at each step of the negotiations." 135
It is critical that the legislature consider carefully the types of impasse
procedures to be established by a collective bargaining statute. Generally,
such procedures should be flexible and include at least mediation and a
fact-finding procedure. Since it is in the state's interest to avoid impasse
disputes in public sector labor relations, it would seem appropriate that
costs of these procedures be borne by the state rather than by the parties.
Moreover, questions as to what constitutes an "impasse" should be
covered specifically by statute and not left to subsequent determination
by a court or agency Because the term "impasse," like "good faith," is
not susceptible of precise definition, the statute should artificially de-
termine that impasse exists at some given point prior to the budget sub-
mission deadline.136
134. Under Minnesota's new bargaining law, employees may "negotiate" over terms
and conditions of employment and "meet and confer" over other items. MiNN. STAT.
Am. S 179.65 (Supp. 1973). See also Mr. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, S 965 (Supp. 1972).
For a statute which excludes such subjects from discussion, see ORE. REv. STAT.
5 342.440 to .480 (1971).
135. Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 1972). In Virginia, an opimon by
the Attorney General advises that the state's sunshine law requires open sessions.
1969-70 VA. ATr'y GEN. Op. 232.
136. Of course, upon the request of the parties, mediators and fact-finders could be
made available before that time.
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Many experiments have been made with statutory schemes designed to
encourage the resolution of labor disputes. For instance, the results of
fact-finding procedures, which normally are advisory only, could be-
come more persuasive upon the parties if the recommendations were re-
leased to the public, with a resulting development of political pressures
on the parties. Another innovative and attractive impasse procedure, the
"choice of procedure" provision,1 7 permits a state agency to choose
from among a number of post-impasse procedures (including fact-find-
ng, mediation, and binding arbitration) the one which is best tailored
to the dispute. This flexible procedure has the advantage of building un-
certainty into the post-impasse stage, thus making it difficult for the
parties to estimate the consequences of their failing to agree.
Binding interest arbitration is a final dispute settlement procedure
which should receive consideration. It should be viewed as an alternative
to public employee strikes, which, as the newspapers reflect, still occur
notwithstanding their prohibition.38 Experimentation by the states with
binding interest arbitration appears to be bearing fruitful resultsaa To
make the procedure more acceptable to various groups, many jurisdic-
tions have placed restrictions on its use, such as limtmg it to disputes in-
volving certain "critical" employees, excluding from its coverage certain
subjects such as salaries and wages, and making it voluntary, with an
agency or the parties retaming some discretion over when it should be
invoked. It has been argued that the specter of binding arbitration would
cause meaningful bargaining to cease and "positioning" for the arbitra-
tor's award to begin; however, techniques are being developed to dimin-
ish such a result. For example, "selective last offer" arbitration holds
each party to his final offer on each issue and allows the arbitrator to
decide each question on an all-or-nothing basis. 4 °
In the absence or upon the failure of final dispute settlement pro-
cedures, the possibility of strikes is real and should be dealt with forth-
rightly in legislation. It must be decided, as a matter of public policy,
whether public employee strikes should be expressly permitted or pro-
hibited. If they are to be unlawful, realistic penalties and enforcement
137. For a discussion of tus procedure and its use, see H. WsruNroN & R. WIn-
TR, JR., supra note 6, at 185-86.
138. See Brown, supra note 7, at 310-12.
139. See generally McAvoy, supra note 66.
140. See Garber, Compulsory Arbitratton mn the Public Sector, 26 ARB. J. (ns.) 226
(1971); H. WLiNGTON & R. WiNraa, JR., supra note 6, at 180. See also McAvoy,
supra note 66.
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procedures must be designed to satisfy the needs of the state and its citi-
zens while, at the same time, allowing the public employer some flex-
ibility in negotiating with the representative of its employees and in
being able to retain a necessary work force. If strikes are permitted, re-
strictive provisions are available to protect the public interest. In Penn-
sylvania, for example, a limited right to strike is terminated upon a show-
Ing of a clear and present danger to the community Further protection
can be provided by withholding the right to strike from certain "critical"
employees.141
IV CONCLUSION
The growing needs of public sector labor relations as well as the
emerging patterns of response to those needs are apparent. As more public
employees organize and demand the right to bargain collectively,
the need for comprehensive state or federal legislation increases. Ob-
servation of the statutory responses in most states, the need in others for
judicial development of rights of public employees, and the political
climate generally suggests that the time for unregulated, extra-legal
growth of bargaining relationslups is past. By drawing upon the experi-
ence of other states with various alternatives, states with inadequate or
nonexistent public sector collective bargaining legislation can maximize
the legislative opportunity with which they are faced.
141. "Critical" employees most often include such categories as police, firefighters,
and mental hospital and prison guards.
